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ABSTRACT 
 
It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade 
fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear 
reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step 
in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear 
reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce 
HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification 
techniques that ensure uranium is only enriched to LEU, no undeclared LEU is produced, and no uranium 
is enriched to HEU or secretly diverted. 
 
There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion, which 
uses older technology and requires a lot of energy, and gas centrifuge separation, which uses more 
advanced technology and is more energy efficient. Gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) provide about 40% 
of current world enrichment capacity, but are being phased out as newer gas centrifuge enrichment plants 
(GCEPs) are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity are always approximate, 
due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at enrichment plants, largely 
determined by economic interests. Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million 
kg-separative work units (SWU) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas 
centrifuge plants. Another 23 million SWU/year of capacity are under construction or planned for the near 
future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. Other less-efficient techniques have also been used 
in the past, including electromagnetic and aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at 
least from a commercial perspective. Laser isotope separation shows promise as a possible enrichment 
technique of the future, but has yet to be demonstrated commercially. 
 
In the early 1980s, six countries developing gas centrifuge technology (United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia) along with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) began developing effective 
safeguards techniques for GCEPs. This effort was known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP). 
The HSP had the goal of maximizing safeguards effectiveness while minimizing the cost to the operator 
and inspectorate, and adopted several recommendations, such as the acceptance of limited-frequency 
unannounced access (LFUA) inspections in cascade halls, and the use of nondestructive assay (NDA) 
measurements and tamper-indicating seals. While only the HSP participants initially committed to 
implementing all the measures of the approach, it has been used as a model for the safeguards applied to 
GCEPs in additional states. 
 
This report provides a snapshot overview of world enrichment capacity in 2007, including profiles of the 
uranium enrichment programs of individual states. It is based on open-source information, which is 
dependent on unclassified sources and may therefore not reflect the most recent developments. In 
addition, it briefly describes some of the safeguards techniques being used at various enrichment plants, 
including implementation of HSP recommendations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is generally agreed that the most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is acquiring weapons grade 
fissile material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Plutonium is produced in a nuclear 
reactor, while HEU is produced using a uranium enrichment process. Enrichment is also an important step 
in the civil nuclear fuel cycle, in producing low-enriched uranium (LEU) for use in fuel for nuclear 
reactors. However, the same equipment used to produce LEU for nuclear fuel can also be used to produce 
HEU for weapons. Safeguards at an enrichment plant are the array of assurances and verification 
techniques that ensure uranium is enriched only to LEU, and none is enriched to HEU or secretly 
diverted. This report provides a snapshot overview of world enrichment capacity in 2007, including 
profiles of the uranium enrichment programs of individual states, and describes some of the safeguards 
techniques being used at various enrichment plants. It is based on open-source information, which is 
dependent on unclassified sources and may therefore not reflect the most recent developments. 
1.1 ENRICHMENT OVERVIEW 
Enrichment is the process of concentrating the fissile isotope of natural uranium, 235U (0.711% by weight 
in natural uranium). Higher concentrations of 235U make nuclear fission chain reactions easier to maintain. 
LEU (less than 20% 235U) allows some nuclear reactor designs to produce sustained power for electricity 
production, while HEU (greater than 20% 235U) allows the possibility that a chain reaction will 
exponentially increase, resulting in a nuclear explosion. 
 
There are several techniques for enriching uranium. The two most prevalent are gaseous diffusion and gas 
centrifuge separation. Gaseous diffusion relies on the preferential permeability of 235U through a porous 
membrane. It uses older technology and the separation factor (increase in enrichment) of a single stage is 
very small. More than a thousand stages must be linked in cascades (the Georges Besse plant in France 
uses approximately 1400 stages to produce LEU1), requiring a lot of energy, a large amount of in-process 
uranium, and a long time to reach equilibrium. Gas centrifuge separation relies on the mass difference in 
the uranium isotopes to concentrate heavier isotopes at the edge of a rapidly spinning cylinder. It requires 
somewhat more advanced technology and materials, and the separation factor per centrifuge is greater, so 
fewer stages are required to make a cascade, making it more energy efficient. In addition, gas centrifuge 
enrichment plant (GCEP) capacity can be increased simply by adding more centrifuge cascades in 
parallel, allowing expandability if needs change whereas gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) are not as 
flexible. Other less-efficient techniques have been used in the past, including electromagnetic and 
aerodynamic separations, but these are considered obsolete, at least from a commercial perspective. Laser 
isotope separation (LIS), using laser light to selectively excite and ionize molecules (MLIS – Molecular 
Laser Isotope Separation) or individual atoms (AVLIS – Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation), shows 
promise as a cost effective enrichment technique of the future, but has not yet been demonstrated 
commercially. 
1.2 WORLD ENRICHMENT CAPACITY 
Gaseous diffusion was initially the dominant process for providing enrichment services, and GDPs 
continue to provide about 40% of current world enrichment capacity. However, these older plants are 
being phased out as newer GCEPs are constructed. Estimates of current and future enrichment capacity 
are always approximate, due to the constant upgrades, expansions, and shutdowns occurring at 
enrichment plants, largely determined by economic interests. In addition, most plants are not continuously 
operated at their maximum capacities. In general, capacity does not equate directly with actual 
production. Table 1 gives a summary of current and planned capacity at world enrichment plants. All of 
the values are referenced in this report, in the text of the appropriate section for each state.
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Table 1. World enrichment plants 
State Plant Name/Location Owner/Operator Type Status Capacity(kgSWU/year) 
Argentina Pilcaniyeu CNEA Gaseous Diffusion Standby 20,000 
Australia Lucas Heights AAEC Centrifuge Shutdown/Dismantled Laboratory 
Brazil Aramar Brazilian Navy, CNEN Centrifuge Operating 9,000 
 Resende INB Centrifuge Operating/Under Construction 120,000 
China Heping CNNC Gaseous Diffusion Operating 200,000 
 Lanzhou CNNC Gaseous Diffusion Shutdown 900,000 
 Lanzhou CNNC Centrifuge Operating 500,000 
    Planned 500,000 
 Shaanxi – Hanzhong CNNC Centrifuge Operating 500,000 
France Pierrelatte GDP CEA Gaseous Diffusion Shutdown 500,000 
 Georges Besse I – Tricastin Eurodif Gaseous Diffusion Operating 10,800,000 
 Georges Besse II – Tricastin Areva Centrifuge Planned 7,500,000 
Germany Gronau Urenco Centrifuge Operating 1,800,000 
    Planned 2,700,000 
India BARC, Trombay DAE Centrifuge Operating Pilot 
 Rattehalli Rare Materials Plant, 
Mysore IREL/DAE Centrifuge Operating 4-10,000 
Iran Natanz PFEP AEOI Centrifuge Operating Pilot 
 Natanz FEP AEOI Centrifuge Operating/Under Construction 250,000 
Japan Ningyo-Toge Pilot & Demo JAEA Centrifuge Shutdown 250,000 
 Rokkasho  JNFL Centrifuge Operating 300,000 
    Planned 1,200,000 
Netherlands Almelo Urenco Centrifuge Operating 3,500,000 
    Planned 1,000,000 
Pakistan KRL Kahuta PAEC Centrifuge Operating 15-20,000 
 Unconfirmed plant, Kundian PAEC Centrifuge Planned Unknown 
Russia Urals ElectroChemical Combine –  
Novouralsk Rosatom Centrifuge Operating 9,800,000 
 Siberian Chemical Combine – 
Seversk Rosatom Centrifuge Operating 2,800,000 
 Zelenogorsk ElectroChemical 
Plant Rosatom Centrifuge Operating 5,800,000 
 Angarsk ElectroChemical 
Combine Rosatom Centrifuge Operating 1,600,000 
South Africa Z-Plant – Pelindaba NECSA Aerodynamic Shutdown/Dismantled 300,000 
 Y-Plant – Valendaba NECSA Aerodynamic Shutdown/Dismantled 10,000 
United Kingdom Capenhurst BNFL Gaseous Diffusion Shutdown 350,000 
  Urenco Centrifuge Operating 3,700,000 
United States Oak Ridge GDP US DOE Gaseous Diffusion Shutdown 8,500,000 
 Paducah USEC Gaseous Diffusion Operating 11,300,000 
 Portsmouth USEC Gaseous Diffusion Standby 7,400,000 
 National Enrichment Facility Urenco  Centrifuge Under Construction 3,000,000 
 Lead Cascade, Piketon  USEC Centrifuge Under Construction  Pilot 
 American Centrifuge Plant, 
Piketon USEC Centrifuge  Planned 3,800,000 
 Unnamed Areva project Areva Centrifuge Pre-licensing 3,000,000 
 SILEX Test Loop, Wilmington GE-Hitachi SILEX Under Construction Pilot 
 SILEX Plant GE-Hitachi SILEX Pre-licensing 3.5-6,000,000 
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The capacity for plants listed as “shutdown” or “dismantled” is the maximum capacity the plant was 
designed for when it was operating. For plants listed as “operating/under construction,” the capacity is the 
total design capacity; oftentimes cascades are put into operation as they are completed. 
 
Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg separative work units (kg SWU, 
often referred to just as SWU in this report) per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million 
in gas centrifuge plants (Table 2). Plants to produce another 24 million SWU/year are under construction 
or planned for the near future, almost entirely using gas centrifuge separation. This report only discusses 
enrichment facilities that use isotope separation processes to produce uranium enriched in 235U. A large 
proportion of world demand for LEU fuel is currently being met by downblending excess weapons-grade 
HEU,2 and this capacity is often reported as “SWU-equivalent,” meaning the enrichment capacity that 
would be required to produce an equivalent amount of LEU. Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, produced by 
mixing reprocessed plutonium with uranium, is also sometimes measured in SWU equivalents, and adds 
to the total world SWU supply. 
 
Table 2. Total world enrichment capacity 
 Operating Planned/under construction 
Total 53 million kg SWU/year 24 million kg SWU/year 
Centrifuge 31 million kg SWU/year 24 million kg SWU/year 
Gaseous diffusion 22 million kg SWU/year 20,000 kg SWU/year               (planned restart of Pilcaniyeu) 
1.3 THE HEXAPARTITE SAFEGUARDS PROJECT 
In the early 1980s, six countries with gas centrifuge technology (United States, United Kingdom, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and Australia) along with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) began investigating effective 
safeguards techniques for GCEPs. This effort was known as the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP). 
The HSP had four specific objectives for maximizing effectiveness and efficiency3: 
 
1. Maximize safeguards (verification) effectiveness; 
2. Minimize the risk of acquiring sensitive information and technology by the inspectorate; 
3. Minimize the intrusiveness and cost to facility operators; and 
4. Minimize inspectorate resource requirements to carry out the verification. 
 
The HSP reached a consensus that HEU production was a greater proliferation risk than LEU diversion, 
and focused verification techniques on the detection of HEU. The project adopted several 
recommendations, including the acceptance of random limited-frequency unannounced access (LFUA) to 
cascade halls, the necessity of inspector access to cascade halls within 2 hours of the request (2 hours was 
considered long enough for the operator to protect proprietary information but not long enough to remove 
all evidence of illicit activity), and the use of nondestructive assay (NDA) measurements and tamper-
indicating seals. While only the HSP participants initially committed to implementing all the measures of 
the approach, it has been used as a model for the safeguards applied to GCEPs in additional states. The 
IAEA investigates new measures and incorporates new technologies as the techniques and 
implementation of safeguards continue to evolve. This includes expanding its authority by implementing 
strengthened safeguards and encouraging states to adopt an Additional Protocol, and integrating advanced 
technologies to assist in better meeting the HSP goal of detecting diversion or misuse of declared material 
at declared facilities. Additional measures, such as environmental sampling (ES) and wide-area 
monitoring, provide some capability to detect undeclared feeds, materials and activities, which were all 
beyond the scope of the original HSP. 
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2. P-5 STATES 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) recognizes five nuclear weapons states (NWS), those that 
“manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 
1967”4: United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China. These states are also the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, designated the “P-5.” The NWS are not required under 
the NPT to have their nuclear facilities and material safeguarded by the IAEA. However, they can 
designate some facilities and material to be put under safeguards as part of a “voluntary offer,” as a 
gesture of goodwill or to ease multinational collaboration. In addition, a supplier state can require that 
nuclear material from that state be put under safeguards as a condition of exporting to a NWS (e.g., 
Australia’s conditions on selling uranium to China)5. 
2.1 UNITED STATES 
The United States implemented uranium enrichment on an industrial scale as part of the Manhattan 
Project to build a nuclear weapon during World War II. The first techniques used were thermal diffusion, 
which was quickly abandoned, and electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS), where ionized atoms are 
separated by traveling through a strong magnetic field. Large EMIS machines called calutrons were built 
at the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant and supplied the HEU for the United States’ first weapon (Fig.1). By the end 
of the war in 1945, a GDP process building designated K-25 (Fig. 2) had been constructed at Oak Ridge 
with a capacity of about 100,000 SWU/year. Over the next 10 years additional process buildings were 
built at the site, which continued to be referred to as “K-25” although strictly this only refers to the first 
process building. The whole facility was the Oak Ridge GDP, which reached a maximum capacity of 
8,500,000 SWU/year in the early 1980s through numerous equipment improvements and power supply 
increases.6 
 
 
Fig. 1. Alpha Calutron track, Y-12 Plant, United States. 
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In the 1950s, the United States constructed two more large GDPs to increase production capacity: one at 
Paducah, Kentucky (Fig. 3), that first produced enriched uranium in 1952 and was completed in 1954 
(maximum capacity in the 1980s of 11,300,000 SWU/year), the other at Piketon, Ohio (Fig. 4), near 
Portsmouth that went online in 1956 (maximum capacity in the 1980s of 7,400,000 SWU/year). In the 
1960s, the United States ceased enriching uranium for weapons and began producing LEU for 
commercial power plants, in addition to continuing to produce HEU for fuel for research reactors and 
nuclear submarines. The Oak Ridge GDP continued producing LEU for commercial power plants until it 
was shut down in 1985. The Portsmouth GDP produced HEU for research reactors and submarines until 
the “top end” was shut down in the early 1990s, but continued to produce LEU until the rest of the plant 
was put on standby in 2001. All current uranium enrichment in the United States takes place at the 
Paducah GDP,7 which currently operates at about 2/3 capacity due to power supply limitations. 
 
 
Fig. 2. K-25 building at the Oak Ridge GDP, United States. 
 
In the 1960s the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, predecessor to the Department of Energy (DOE), 
began investigating centrifuge enrichment, and in the 1970s and 80s developed an advanced centrifuge 
design and began constructing a GCEP near its GDP in Piketon, Ohio. More than 1300 centrifuges had 
been installed at the facility by 1985, when the project was shut down. Finishing and operating the plant 
seemed uneconomical, because SWU demand had fallen short of earlier projections and was being met by 
the GDPs. In addition, the United States had decided to refocus research and development efforts on 
AVLIS technology,8 work that was suspended in 1999.9  These centrifuges were stored until 2006 (Fig. 
6), when they were dismantled and buried at the Nevada Test Site.10 
 
The United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), the current operator of the Portsmouth and Paducah 
GDPs, has been constructing since May 2007 a GCEP called the American Centrifuge Plant at its 
Portsmouth site, in the building that originally housed the DOE centrifuge project in the 1980s. The 
USEC centrifuge design is also based largely on the DOE design from that project. USEC has constructed 
a “Lead Cascade” demonstration facility and is testing the individual centrifuges with uranium gas. USEC 
expects to operate the full cascade by October 2007 and begin commercial operations at the facility by the 
end of the decade.11 
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Fig. 3. Paducah GDP, United States. Fig. 4. Portsmouth GDP, United States. 
 
Fig. 5. Gaseous diffusion cell, United States. Fig. 6. U.S. DOE centrifuges, United States. 
 
 
Fig. 7. National Enrichment Facility visual model, United States.  Source: nefnm.com 
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Louisiana Energy Services (LES), a Urenco subsidiary12, is licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) to build a 3 million SWU/year GCEP in the United States and began construction on 
the National Enrichment Facility (NEF) (Fig. 7) near Eunice, New Mexico, in 2006.13  The license, issued 
in June 2006, authorizes LES to produce LEU up to 5% 235U for use as nuclear fuel in commercial power 
plants. The plant is expected to start initial operation in 2008, with full capacity reached in 2013.14 
 
In May 2007, Areva held a pre-application meeting with the NRC on constructing another 3 million 
SWU/year gas centrifuge plant in the United States. This project is still in the initial planning phase and a 
site is not scheduled to be selected until the end of 2007, but Areva plans to start construction in 2010 and 
initial operation by 2013.15 
 
A laser isotope separation process called SILEX (separation of isotopes by laser excitation), a variation of 
MLIS, has been developed by Silex Systems Limited at the Lucas Heights Science and Technology 
Centre in Australia. In 1996, USEC secured the rights to evaluate and develop SILEX for commercial 
uranium enrichment. In May 2000, President Clinton and the U.S. Congress approved a U.S.–Australian 
agreement for cooperation on the development of SILEX technology. In June 2001, SILEX technology 
was officially classified by the U.S. and Australian governments, bringing the project formally under the 
security and regulatory protocols of each country. USEC relinquished its rights in 2003, and Silex signed 
a “Commercialization and License Agreement” with General Electric (GE) in May 2006.16  In October 
2006, Silex announced that it and GE have received U.S. government authorization to proceed with an 
agreement granting GE exclusive rights to develop and commercialize SILEX uranium enrichment 
technology. The SILEX process is also being used in Australia to enrich lighter elements, such as silicon 
and zirconium. The uranium enrichment application of SILEX is currently in the final stage, the “Test 
Loop” phase, of a three-stage development program. The Test Loop is being constructed at GE’s fuel 
fabrication facility in Wilmington, NC, to simulate a full-scale facility for performance and reliability 
verification (GE and Japan-based Hitachi formed a joint venture of their nuclear businesses in early 
2007. GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy encompasses the power reactor and fuel cycle operations of both 
companies, including the SILEX project in Wilmington.17)  After successful completion of the Test Loop 
stage, planned for the end of 2008, licensing and construction will begin on the “Lead Cascade” 
commercial production plant, which is expected to begin operation around 2012.18  Early projections by 
GE-Hitachi state that the eventual commercial SILEX facility in the United States will have a capacity of 
between 3.5–6 million SWU/year, and several nuclear utilities have signed non-binding letters of intent to 
contract for enrichment services when the commercial facility becomes operational.19 
2.2 UNITED KINGDOM 
The United Kingdom constructed a GDP near Capenhurst. The plant had a maximum capacity of 
approximately 350,000 SWU/year and began operation in 1953.20  British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. (BNFL) 
took control of the plant in 1971, and it was shut down in 1982. Full decommissioning is expected to be 
completed in 2009.21 
 
BNFL began construction of a GCEP at Capenhurst in 1973. A 200,000 SWU/year demonstration plant 
(designated E21) began operation in 1976, was completed in 1980, and was shut down in 2000. A larger 
facility, E22, was started in 1982 and ultimately increased the site capacity to 1,000,000 SWU/year. In 
1985, the facility A3 was constructed to provide enrichment for defense needs. The facility A3 was later 
converted to commercial enrichment. The E23 facility began operating in 1997 and is continuing to add 
capacity. The GCEP at Capenhurst is currently operated by Urenco.  The entire site capacity is reported to 
be approximately 3,700,000 SWU/year.22 
 
All of the HSP measures have been implemented at the Capenhurst facility (Fig. 8). Inspections are 
performed jointly by the IAEA and Euratom. Following Program 93+2, UK accepted ES as a Part 1 
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strengthening measure. Capenhurst has also allowed continuous (on-line) enrichment monitoring 
(CEMO) since about 1995. The CEMO system transmits a simple go/no-go message daily to the IAEA, 
indicating that the system is operating properly and the measured enrichment is within the bounds of the 
declaration. If the CEMO transmits that something is out of the ordinary, an inspector must be sent to 
determine what the problem is. In the early 1990s, the British Support Program to the IAEA installed the 
CEMO system for the product header pipes. Prior to that, U.K. allowed the IAEA to measure enrichment 
(again with go/no-go determination only) with a portable germanium detector acting as a cascade header 
enrichment monitor (CHEM), but only at the location selected by U.K. outside the cascade hall. The 
CEMO systems have been installed on product header pipes at the facility and provide data directly to 
IAEA Headquarters in Vienna via a remote data transfer. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Urenco Capenhurst, U.K.  Source: GlobalSecurity.org 
 
The British have stated that they developed this system in recognition that future cascade designs would 
be much more dynamic and flexible. Video surveillance cameras are installed in locations that are not 
visually accessible for LFUAs. Although the GDP at Capenhurst has been completely dismantled, the 
remnants of past HEU production are still detectable by the ES activities at the adjacent centrifuge 
facility.23 
2.3 RUSSIA 
The Russian effort to enrich uranium started immediately after World War II. Russia (the Soviet Union, at 
that time) began using gaseous diffusion technology, but refocused on gas centrifuge enrichment much 
earlier than the United States, opening its first industrial centrifuge facility in the early 1960s. Russian 
innovation in the early 1950s led directly to some of the principles of centrifuge design (magnetic 
bearings, stationary scoops, short, subcritical rotors, etc.) widely used today by Russia, Urenco, and 
others. In the 1970s and 80s, Russia replaced all of its gaseous diffusion equipment with several 
generations of centrifuges; the pre-assembling of 20-machine “aggregates” (Fig. 14) by the manufacturers 
allowed centrifuges to be rapidly installed in former gaseous diffusion buildings. The Russian centrifuge 
program is run by state-owned Tekhsnabexport, now a subsidiary of Atomenergoprom, a company 
created in 2007 as an umbrella organization for the Russian civil nuclear industry. Russia is operating 
plants at four sites: (1) the Urals ElectroChemical Combine in Novouralsk, formerly referred to as 
Sverdlovsk-44, near Ekaterinburg (9,800,000 SWU/year); (2) the Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk, 
formerly Tomsk-7 (2,800,000 SWU/year); (3) the ElectroChemical Plant in Zelenogorsk, formerly 
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Krasnoyarsk-45 (5,800,000 SWU/year); and (4) the Angarsk ElectroChemical Combine (1,600,000 
SWU/year). Russia’s four plants (Figs. 9–13) account for approximately 40% of the world’s operating 
enrichment capacity. Russia is continuing to increase its enrichment capacity by upgrading centrifuges to 
7th-, 8th-, and 9th-generation designs; the capacity is expected to reach 25 million SWU/year by 2010 and 
will continue to increase as older centrifuges reach the end of their design life and are replaced.24 
 
Russia currently has more enrichment capacity than is required for domestic fuel production and there is 
not sufficient demand for LEU for export to utilize the rest of the capacity. It has therefore, since the mid-
1990s, been accepting depleted uranium tails from Urenco and Areva for re-enrichment, producing 
natural-equivalent uranium and lower-assay tails, as well as some slightly enriched uranium to use as 
downblending feedstock, with its surplus enrichment capacity.25  This helps to supplement Russia’s 
limited natural uranium supply (due largely to the loss of Kazakhstan’s uranium reserves after the 
breakup of the Soviet Union). However, Rosatom has announced that it is phasing out re-enrichment of 
depleted uranium (DU) in anticipation of increased world demand of enrichment for LEU production and 
other economic concerns.26 
 
  
Fig. 9. Novouralsk module 3, Russia   Fig. 10. Seversk, Russia 
 
  
Fig. 11. Zelenogorsk, Russia    Fig. 12. Angarsk, Russia 
Source for Figures 9–12: Google Earth 
 
None of the Russian facilities have ever been subject to IAEA safeguards, but Russia has allowed the 
IAEA to conduct carefully designed and controlled ES field trials at Angarsk.  On July 15, 2006, RIA 
Novosti reported: “Russia’s nuclear chief (Sergei Kiriyenko) said the first international uranium 
enrichment center would be established in Angarsk, in southeast Siberia’s Irkutsk Region,” and that 
“Russian and U.S. experts had already started combining Russia’s proposal for creating a network of 
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international uranium enrichment centers, and the U.S. initiative on global partnership in the nuclear 
sphere.”27  Russia added the international fuel services center in Angarsk to its “eligible facility list” for 
safeguarding as part of its voluntary offer.  Currently, the level of safeguards at the center has not been 
determined. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Angarsk centrifuges, Russia. 
Source: www.aecc.ru 
Fig. 13. Novouralsk enrichment complex, Russia.  
Source: Bukharin, 2004.  
2.4 FRANCE 
France constructed a GDP at Pierrelatte to produce HEU for nuclear weapons. HEU production started in 
1967, and the plant’s estimated capacity was around 500,000 SWU/year.28  The lower stages of the plant 
were shut down in the early 1980s. In February 1996, President Jacques Chirac announced that France 
would permanently stop producing fissile material for nuclear weapons and would immediately shut 
down and dismantle the remaining stages of the Pierrelatte enrichment plant.29  HEU production at 
Pierrelatte stopped by the middle of that year.30 
 
The Eurodif (Georges Besse I) gaseous diffusion plant in Tricastin began operation in 1979 and was 
completed in 1982 (Figs. 15, 16). It consists of four process buildings, having a total capacity of 
10,800,000 SWU/year.31  This facility is subject to Euratom safeguards, but is not subject to IAEA 
safeguards. Gaseous diffusion requires a tremendous amount of electricity, so the Eurodif plant is run at 
its maximum capacity during off-peak periods when electricity is cheapest, and production is scaled back 
when electricity demand rises. Eurodif is powered by a direct connection to the four-reactor Tricastin 
nuclear power station, and uses almost their entire electricity output during peak operation.32 
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Fig. 15. Eurodif GDP, France. Source: GlobalSecurity.org 
 
 
Fig. 16. Eurodif diffusion stages, France. 
 
 
Fig. 17. Georges Besse II plant under construction, March 2007.33 
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In July 2006, Areva (parent company of Cogéma) and Urenco announced that they had finalized a “Joint 
Venture” under which Areva will acquire 50% ownership of Urenco’s Enrichment Technology Co. 
(ETC). The agreement had to be approved by the European Commission, and an intergovernmental 
agreement had to be signed by Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and France (the Cardiff Agreement). 
ETC will design and furnish Areva with the centrifuges for a centrifuge plant, Georges Besse II, being 
built at Tricastin.34 Construction on the plant began in September 2006 (Fig. 17). The initial cascades are 
scheduled to begin operating in 2009, and the plant is expected to ramp up to a full capacity of 7.5 million 
SWU/year by 2018. The plant’s initial license was granted in April 2007 for a maximum capacity of 8.2 
million SWU/year and a maximum enrichment of 6% 235U.35  When the Georges Besse II plant comes 
online and the Eurodif GDP is shut down, the electricity produced by the four Tricastin reactors will be 
largely freed up for other uses, since centrifuge enrichment is roughly 50 times more electrically efficient 
than gaseous diffusion.36 
2.5 CHINA 
The Chinese gaseous diffusion plant in Lanzhou started operation in 1964 and reached a capacity of 
approximately 200,000 SWU/year by the late 1970s. The plant was further enlarged for commercial 
operation and incorporated advances in diffusion barrier technology,37 and had a reported capacity of 
500,000 SWU/year when it was shut down in 1997. A second gaseous diffusion plant, the Heping plant 
near Chengdu, which is still operating, is reported to have a capacity of 200,000 SWU/year. Neither of 
these gaseous diffusion plants has been subject to IAEA safeguards. 
 
China started researching gas centrifuge technology in the late 1950s. In 1993 Russia and China reached 
an agreement to build a gas centrifuge plant in China using Russian centrifuge technology. The initial 
plant was built at Hanzhong in Shaanxi province with a capacity of 200,000 SWU/year and was 
commissioned in June 1996. The capacity was increased to 500,000 SWU/year in 1998 with the addition 
of a second plant at the site. A third gas centrifuge plant with a capacity of 500,000 SWU/year, which was 
originally going to be built with the other plants in Hanzhong, has instead been built at Lanzhou to take 
on the workers from the shutdown Lanzhou GDP.38  Another 500,000 SWU/year centrifuge plant at 
Lanzhou is planned.39 
 
According to a Tripartite Agreement between China, Russia, and the IAEA, Russian-built plants in China 
are available for safeguarding, but only the Hanzhong gas centrifuge plants in Shaanxi have been subject 
to IAEA safeguards (since China is a nuclear weapons state, safeguarding additional facilities is of low 
priority to the IAEA due to limited resources).40  The safeguards approach for this facility was studied as 
part of the Tripartite Enrichment Project, which studied safeguards approaches for plants equipped with 
Russian centrifuge technology. Some techniques are not feasible at this facility: Russian centrifuge 
systems use steel piping, making CEMOs less effective; the piping arrangement in Russian-designed 
plants is more flexible, meaning that installed systems could be easily bypassed; and due to China’s size 
and the location of the Shaanxi plant, unannounced inspections would not be effective. An approach has 
been adopted which includes routine inspections with material accounting, modified ES, and SWU-
balancing calculations.41 
3. OTHER HSP STATES 
Urenco was founded in 1971 by the national enrichment companies of the UK (BNFL), the Netherlands 
(Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland NV), and Germany (Uranit GmbH), following the signing of the Treaty of 
Almelo in March 1970 that was the basis for collaboration between these three states on development of 
centrifuge technology. The three companies formally merged under Urenco in 1993. Urenco today is an 
enrichment services company that operates GCEPs in the Netherlands, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom, and is constructing a GCEP in the United States. Furthermore, Urenco has an enrichment 
technology group that designs and develops proprietary centrifuges for its plants, and it will also be 
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supplying the centrifuges for the new Areva GCEP in France. It is aggressively expanding capacity at its 
existing enrichment plants and aims to have total capacity in Europe of 11,000,000 SWU/year by 2010, 
not including the joint venture with Areva in France.42 
3.1 GERMANY 
Construction of the Gronau centrifuge plant began in April 1982 and the first cascades were started in 
August 1985 (Fig. 18). Initially, the facility was licensed for up to 1,000,000 SWU/year. In October 1997, 
the German authorities granted a license to increase the capacity to 1,800,000 SWU/year, the current 
capacity. In 1998, Urenco announced plans to build a new 2,200,000 SWU/year plant at the Gronau site 
and has formally applied for a license to increase the total capacity to 4,500,000 SWU/year.43  The plant 
at Gronau uses block-mounted centrifuges (Fig. 19), which have multiple rotors in a single vacuum 
casing. 
  
All of the HSP measures have been implemented at the Gronau facility, but the IAEA had difficulty 
implementing the portable NDA header pipe measure, CHEM, to detect HEU because of the extremely 
low gas pressure, the large deposit-to-gas ratio, the small pipe diameter, and the limited measurement 
time in the cascade hall during an LFUA.44  The Germans have accepted environmental swipe sampling 
as part of the agreed upon Part 1 measures following Program 93+2; however, they are not implementing 
CEMO at Gronau. 
 
  
Fig. 18. Urenco Gronau, Germany.           
 Source: kernenergie.de 
Fig. 19. Block-mounted centrifuges, Gronau.
Source: U.S. DOE 
3.2 NETHERLANDS 
Construction of the initial pilot plants at Almelo (designated SP1 and SP2) began in 1972, and the first 
delivery of enriched UF6 was accomplished in 1976. These pilot plants had an approximate capacity of 
25,000 SWU/year. A 200,000 SWU/year demonstration plant (SP3) was built between 1974 and 1980. 
These three initial plants have been decommissioned. Since 1979, construction has proceeded on two 
larger facilities, SP4 and SP5 (Fig. 20). The current total capacity is 3,500,000 SWU/year, and Urenco has 
applied to expand the capacity of Almelo to 4,500,000 SWU/year. Unlike the Urenco GCEP at Gronau, 
the Almelo facilities use individually mounted centrifuges (Fig. 21). 
 
The Netherlands was a participant in the HSP and have accepted the HSP safeguards measures in their 
facilities since around 1983. Following Program 93+2, they began accepting ES as part of the agreed-
upon Part 1 measures. Reportedly, there is no on-line enrichment monitoring at Almelo, but the 
Netherlands does allow LFUA walkthroughs.45 
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Fig. 20. Urenco Almelo, Netherlands.  
 Source: nrg-nl.com 
Fig. 21. Urenco centrifuges, Almelo.  
Source: world-nuclear.org 
3.3 JAPAN 
The Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation of Japan (PNC) began operating a pilot 
gas centrifuge facilities at Ningyo-Toge in 1979. PNC became the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development 
Institute (JNC) in 1998 and was merged into the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) in 2005. The 
Ningyo-Toge pilot facility had a nominal capacity of 50,000 SWU/year and was shut down in 1990. Two 
100,000 SWU/year demonstration plants began operating at the site in June 1988 and completed 
operation in March 2001.46  These facilities are being dismantled centrifuge-by-centrifuge, with 
individual components decontaminated to reduce radioactive waste volume and destroyed to protect 
sensitive design information.47  In addition, various laboratory-scale enrichment facilities involving gas 
centrifuge, AVLIS, and MLIS technology have been operated, shut down, and dismantled, mostly at 
Tokai.48 
 
 
Fig. 22. Rokkasho Uranium Enrichment Plant, Japan. Source: japannuclear.com 
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The gas centrifuge facility in Rokkasho-mura, the Rokkasho Uranium Enrichment Plant (Fig. 22), was 
built by Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL). Construction began in October 1988, and the initial unit 
began operation in 1992 with a capacity of 150,000 SWU/year. Six additional units have come online to 
increase the total capacity to 1,050,000 SWU/year. Currently, only two of the modules are operating 
(300,000 SWU/year) due to problems with the centrifuges,49 which are not being repaired since they are 
scheduled to be replaced anyway. The production capacity is targeted to increase to 1,500,000 SWU/year 
using advanced centrifuges with carbon fiber-composite rotors.50  In April 2007, JNFL announced the 
start of cascade tests of its advanced centrifuge design. Production using the advance centrifuges is slated 
to begin in 2010.51  The Japanese were participants in the HSP and have implemented all of the HSP 
measures, as well as additional measures such as ES inside the cascade halls, at their demonstration and 
commercial facilities.52 
3.4 AUSTRALIA 
The Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), the predecessor to the Australian Nuclear Science 
and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) had a gas centrifuge research and development program in the 
1970s and 1980s and was a participant in the HSP. Bench-top cascade operation was achieved at the 
Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre (Fig. 23), but the program was terminated in 1983 with no 
pilot plant built.53  When the centrifuge program was terminated, Australia decided to deny the IAEA 
access to the dismantled centrifuge components, on the basis of protecting proprietary technology. All 
blueprints, scientific reports, and components relating to the centrifuge program remain securely stored at 
Lucas Heights. As part of the 93+2 program, the IAEA was allowed limited access to the components for 
verification purposes. In addition, the buildings that housed the centrifuge program were used as an early 
testbed for IAEA environmental sampling techniques: 
 
The buildings had been cleaned out, decontaminated and repeatedly repainted in the 10 
year period before sampling took place. While these activities had been part of a normal 
pattern of building reassignment and usage in the case of Australia’s declared program, 
the activities were similar in nature to the steps a proliferator might use to conceal the 
existence of a clandestine program. IAEA ES had no difficulty in determining the 
location within the building of the various aspects of centrifuge work. The IAEA was 
also able to determine the average enrichment level that was achieved during the research 
project and the maximum level of enrichment achieved.54 
 
However, the technology and expertise for centrifuge enrichment is still present, and the Australian 
government is said to be considering re-launching a uranium enrichment program in the country for the 
purpose of “value-adding” to its current uranium exports, but no actions have been taken at this point.55 
 
Australia is also developing a laser isotope separation process called SILEX (separation of isotopes by 
laser excitation), a variation of MLIS, at Lucas Heights. Silex Systems Limited and GE-Hitachi are 
constructing a “Test Loop” of the SILEX laser enrichment process in Wilmington, NC. In August 2007, 
Silex announced “the successful completion of the transfer of our uranium enrichment project from our 
Lucas Heights facility to GE’s Nuclear Fuel Plant in Wilmington North Carolina.”56  The application of 
this technology in the United States is discussed in the section on the U.S. enrichment program. 
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Fig. 23. Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre, Australia. Source: Google Earth 
4. OTHER NPT STATES 
Several other states have enrichment facilities, although none are currently large enough to produce 
surplus LEU for export. South Africa and Argentina have enrichment facilities that are shutdown, 
although Argentina has announced plans to resume enrichment activities at its plant. Brazil and Iran are 
both constructing moderate-size GCEPs that are reportedly intended to provide LEU for their own power 
reactors, and both plants are safeguarded by the IAEA. 
 
Brazil and Argentina formed the bilateral Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in 1991 as “an entity responsible for verifying that the nuclear materials 
existing in both countries are being used for exclusively peaceful purposes.”57  ABACC inspectors 
implement safeguards measures at the nuclear facilities in both states; Brazil and Argentina also signed a 
Quadripartite Agreement with ABACC and the IAEA in 1991 to coordinate safeguards activities and 
avoid duplicate inspections by the two agencies. ABACC is responsible for coordinating the analysis of 
environmental samples at laboratories in Brazil and Argentina,58,59 and is working to optimize HSP 
safeguards techniques for the lower-capacity centrifuge enrichment facilities under its jurisdiction.60 
 
States have also done laboratory-scale experiments in uranium enrichment, although no production 
facilities were planned or built. In 2004, the Republic of Korea disclosed as part of its Additional Protocol 
declaration that in 2000 government scientists had performed unauthorized enrichment of uranium during 
a larger project of enriching stable isotopes with an AVLIS process.61  The experiments produced about 
200 milligrams of uranium enriched up to 77% 235U.62 
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4.1 BRAZIL 
Brazil has two operating pilot gas centrifuge facilities at the Aramar Experimental Center, located about 
100 kilometers west of Sao Paulo (Fig. 24). The total capacity of these two plants is reported to be about 
9,000 SWU/year.63  A commercial enrichment facility is under construction at a site near Resende (Fig. 
25), located about 100 kilometers from Rio de Janeiro. The Resende site also contains a fuel-fabrication 
facility and a UF6-to-UO2 uranium conversion plant. The enrichment plant is being constructed by state-
owned Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB), which signed a contract with the Brazilian navy in 2000 to 
use navy-designed centrifuges.64  The first module, which will eventually contain four cascades, now has 
one cascade operating and a second under construction. UF6 was introduced into the first cascade in early 
2005. The first unit was officially inaugurated by the Ministry of Science and Technology in May 2006.65  
The plant is expected to be operating at full capacity (four modules of four cascades each, for a total of 
approximately 120,000 SWU/year) by 2015. This will be enough enrichment capacity to provide about 
half of the yearly requirement of LEU fuel for Brazil’s existing power reactors, Angra-I and -II. 
 
 
Fig. 24. Aramar Experimental Center, Brazil.  Source: Google Earth 
 
The specific safeguards approach for the Resende plant was under negotiation for a number of years. 
Brazil is concerned with restricting access to proprietary information about its centrifuge design, which 
reportedly has two proprietary active magnetic bearings, top and bottom, instead of the usual one in other 
commercial centrifuge designs.66  Differences centered on whether IAEA inspectors would be allowed 
full visual access within the cascade hall or whether Brazil would be allowed to keep the equipment 
shrouded. Brazil and the IAEA finally reached agreement on the safeguards approach in the fall of 2004.67  
Under the agreed-upon approach, IAEA inspectors are not permitted to remove visual information about 
the cascades at Resende and Aramar. The inspectors are allowed to have limited visual access to the 
cascades and compare what they see to a validated set of baseline photographs held by the operator under 
IAEA seal. The compromise, which also allowed Brazil to shroud access to the bearings in the first 
module, applies only to this first stage of operation at Resende. The agreement will be re-negotiated and 
the casings redesigned for safeguarding the full-capacity plant. 
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Fig. 25. Resende Nuclear Fuel Facility, Brazil. Source: Google Earth 
 
At Aramar, ES is permitted only for cylinders and the feed and withdrawal (F/W) stations. At Resende, 
ES is also allowed inside the cascade hall. All inspections are essentially unannounced inspections (UIs) 
with full access to F/W stations and the results of destructive assay (DA) measurements. NDA inside the 
cascade halls is not considered in the approach at Resende; however, the IAEA has been permitted to take 
supplemental NDA measurements at Aramar to compensate for the lack of complete visual access. 
 
The Brazilian president recently announced funding to complete construction of the Angra-3 reactor, and 
emphasized that one of the aims of the country’s nuclear program is to design, build, and fuel a nuclear 
submarine.68 
4.2 ARGENTINA 
In the late 1970s through early 1980s, when Argentina was under military rule and before it acceded to 
the NPT, it began a secret program to develop indigenous gaseous diffusion technology. The existence of 
this technology, and the gaseous diffusion enrichment plant built at Pilcaniyeu (Figs. 26, 27) in the Rio 
Negro province, were successfully concealed until the government of President Raúl Alfonsin revealed 
them, shortly after the restoration of civilian rule. 
 
Plant operation at Pilcaniyeu was suspended in the late 1980s with the intention to restart it after some 
upgrades were completed. With the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement in 1994, the facility became 
subject to full scope safeguards. Although not operating, the IAEA still had to verify the material 
inventory. Since this was the first gaseous diffusion plant subjected to IAEA safeguards, the Agency 
needed a method to verify the in-process cascade inventory. Cascade inventory verification had not been a 
significant concern for centrifuge plants because the process inventory of a GCEP is on the order of a 
thousand times smaller than that for a GDP. After the inventory was verified with assistance from the 
U.S. Support Program, the IAEA continues to verify that the status of the plant is unchanged and the plant 
has not operated. 
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Fig. 26. Pilcaniyeu, Argentina.   Source: Google Earth 
 
 
Fig. 27. Argentine diffusers, Pilcaniyeu.  Source: Whitaker, 200569 
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Reportedly, the initial planned capacity was 20,000 SWU/year with longer-term plans to expand to 
100,000 SWU/year. A portion of the cascade was completed in the mid-1980s, but the plant has never 
operated well due to problems with short barrier life, leaking seals, and compressor reliability. The 
cascade consists of 20 units with 20 stages each (400 stages total). During its operation, Argentina 
produced only small amounts of LEU. In 1989 the cascade was shut down, and a new 20-stage pilot plant 
with improved technology was opened in December 1993. Renovation of the older plant, to be operated 
under safeguards, was subsequently undertaken but progress was slow and was plagued with long periods 
of inactivity. 
 
On August 23, 2006, however, Planning Minister Julio De Vido announced that Argentina is going to 
expand its nuclear program, including completion of the Atucha 2 and CAREM reactors and reactivation 
of its uranium enrichment capability at Pilcaniyeu, initially reported to begin sometime in 2007.70  
According to one report, Argentina now plans to enrich uranium up to 5 percent 235U. It has been reported 
that one of the reasons for resuming enrichment is to establish Argentina’s place as an enrichment 
supplier country. Canada announced in July of 2007 that it had reached a preliminary agreement with 
Argentina on supplying a new CANDU reactor beyond Atucha 2.71 
4.3 SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa constructed and operated two enrichment plants at Pelindaba (Fig. 28): one to produce HEU 
for a weapons program (“Y-Plant”) and a second semi-commercial plant to produce LEU (“Z-Plant”). 
Both plants used a unique aerodynamic enrichment method called the Helikon vortex separation process. 
The Helikon process requires large amounts of electricity and produces a lot of waste heat, making it 
uneconomical as a commercial enrichment process. Using HEU from Y-Plant, South Africa assembled 
six gun-type nuclear weapons, and a seventh was being constructed when the country revealed the 
program and began to dismantle its weapons program.72  The HEU plant was shut down prior to South 
Africa acceding to the NPT in 1991, and the IAEA applied safeguards to the semi-commercial plant until 
it was shut down in 1995.73  In 1994, the IAEA confirmed that South Africa’s nuclear weapons program 
had been completely terminated and dismantled.74 
 
 
Fig. 28. Pelindaba, South Africa.    Source: Google Earth 
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In August 2006, the Minister of Minerals and Energy said that South Africa would conduct a cost-benefit 
study on reviving the country’s enrichment program (uranium “beneficiation”) as part of a larger effort to 
expand its nuclear power industry.75  A draft of South Africa’s nuclear energy policy, released for public 
comment in July 2007, states that the “Government’s strategic intent is to develop national capacity in 
uranium enrichment as part of uranium beneficiation. Government, through the Nuclear Energy 
Corporation of South Africa (NECSA), shall investigate the viability of developing its own uranium 
enrichment capabilities and will simultaneously actively seek to acquire established uranium enrichment 
technologies to ensure security of supply.”76 
4.4 IRAQ 
Iraq began investigating clandestine uranium enrichment for a nuclear weapons program after the 
bombing of the Osirak reactor by Israel in 1981 conveyed the need to pursue parallel fissile material 
programs (plutonium production and uranium enrichment). Iraqi scientists chose to primarily pursue 
EMIS technology in the near term, with gaseous diffusion as a backup and to produce LEU feedstock for 
the EMIS program, and gas centrifuge enrichment as a longer-term goal. Some preliminary research also 
took place on laser enrichment. Construction began on the first EMIS facility in 1987. Progress on both 
EMIS and diffusion was slow, and in 1988 officials decided to de-emphasize diffusion and concentrate 
more on centrifuges.  According to David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security 
(ISIS), who conducted interviews with Iraqis and Germans involved with the program, Iraq received illicit 
assistance from German centrifuge experts.77  They also pursued chemical enrichment as another LEU 
feedstock provider for EMIS. The 1990–1991 Gulf War and especially the bombing campaign against 
Iraq in January 1991 brought the program to a halt. At this point, the Iraqi enrichment program had only 
succeeded in producing a few grams of uranium enriched to slightly over 20% 235U. IAEA inspections of 
Iraq’s nuclear facilities began in the summer of 1991, after the war ended (Figs. 29, 30).78  Inspections 
continued until inspectors were withdrawn in December 1998, amid continuing international suspicion 
that Iraq was continuing parts of its nuclear program; IAEA inspections resumed in November 2002.79  
After the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, U.S. inspectors attempted to secure all known 
Iraqi nuclear materials and facilities.80 
 
 
Fig. 29. Calutron wreckage in Iraq in the 1990s.   Source: fas.org 
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Fig. 30. Centrifuges discovered in Iraq by IAEA inspectors in the 1990s. Source: iaea.org 
4.5 LIBYA 
In December 2003 Libya publicly revealed and renounced its nuclear weapons program. IAEA inspection 
teams were in Libya by the end of the month, and IAEA and foreign experts worked with Libya to 
thoroughly verify its declaration and secure the nuclear material and equipment. In March 2004, Libya 
signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.81 
 
 
Fig. 31. Libyan centrifuge casings. 
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Libya based its enrichment program on equipment and information obtained through the A.Q. Khan 
network. The IAEA reports that in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Libya obtained 20 complete L-1 (or 
P-1) centrifuges and 2 complete L-2 (or P-2) centrifuges through the network, as well as at least some of 
the parts necessary for 200 additional L-1 and 10,000 additional L-2 centrifuges, largely produced at a 
factory in Malaysia under the direction of A.Q. Khan associates.82  By 2002 several small test cascades 
had been partially constructed but never operated, and these were all dismantled and put into storage by 
the time of Libya’s declaration.83  Much of Libya’s centrifuge equipment and nuclear material, including 
four cylinders of UF6, was transported in January 2004 to the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak 
Ridge for storage (Fig. 31).84,85 
4.6 IRAN  
It was revealed to the public in 2002 that Iran was constructing a centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment 
at Natanz, south of Tehran, as well as a heavy water production plant at Arak.86  The Natanz facility (Figs. 
32, 33) includes a small Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) with two 164-centrifuge cascades and 
several smaller test cascades, and a full-scale underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) designed for 
approximately 50,000 centrifuges and an estimated total capacity of 250,000 SWU/year.87  The facility is 
overseen by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The designs for the centrifuges at Natanz as 
well as many centrifuges and centrifuge components were supplied to Iran by the A.Q. Khan network. 
 
Iran has been enriching small amounts of uranium at the PFEP since April 2006, and construction and 
installation of the first module of centrifuges is continuing at the FEP. As of the August 2007 Director 
General’s report to the IAEA Board of Governors, Iran was enriching uranium in twelve 164-centrifuge 
cascades at the FEP, operating one cascade without UF6, vacuum-testing one, and installing two more. 
Since operation at the FEP began in February 2007 until the IAEA report in August, Iran had fed 
approximately 690 kilograms of natural UF6 into the cascades, and ES by the IAEA had verified the 
production of uranium enriched up to 3.7% 235U. The IAEA is continuing to implement safeguards, 
including unannounced inspections and containment and surveillance measures, at the facilities at 
Natanz.88,89 
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Fig. 32. Natanz, Iran.  Source: Google Earth 
 
 
Fig. 33. 164-centrifuge cascade at the Natanz PFEP, Iran.  Source: Wood90 
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5. NON-NPT STATES 
Two states that are not parties of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India and Pakistan, are known to 
have developed enrichment capabilities. Both have tested nuclear devices, although only Pakistan is 
believed to utilize uranium enrichment as a key component of its nuclear weapons program. 
 
There have been reports that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, “North Korea”) has 
been developing a clandestine enrichment capability as part of a nuclear weapons program.  An 
unclassified 2002 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate said that DPRK had done at least research and 
development for an HEU project, and subsequent unclassified intelligence reports to the U.S. Congress 
stated that DPRK was constructing a full-scale enrichment facility.91   
 
In an interview with NPR in March 2007, Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs and head of the U.S. delegation to the Six Party Talks, stated that the United States 
continues “to assess that North Korea has attempted and succeeded in buying a number of parts to put 
together a uranium enrichment program.  How far they got and whether they were successful in actually 
manufacturing highly enriched uranium, that’s hard to say.”92,93 
 
There continues to be a high level of uncertainty about the nature and extent of DPRK’s uranium 
enrichment program, prompting questions and debate from non-governmental analysts and members of 
Congress.  For example, Selig Harrison of the Center for International Policy wrote in Foreign Affairs in 
2005 that the “administration presented a worst-case scenario as an incontrovertible truth and distorted its 
intelligence on North Korea.”94  Former administration officials Mitchell Reiss and Robert Gallucci 
responded in the next issue of Foreign Affairs that “the case has been made and is credible.”95  A 
February 2007 analysis from ISIS concluded that DPRK likely obtained centrifuge equipment from the 
A.Q. Khan network, but stated that it is not clear that an enrichment facility was ever built.96  In March 
2007, U.S. Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote to the U.S. 
Secretaries of State and Defense asking for clarification of intelligence regarding DPRK’s uranium 
enrichment program, after Congressional testimony by administration officials and media reports 
suggested that government officials were downplaying previous assessments.97 
 
Israel, the final non-NPT state, is also widely believed to have nuclear weapons but these are largely 
thought to be plutonium weapons. A former Dimona technician, Mordechai Vanunu, leaked information 
and photographs of activities at Dimona to the British press in 1986, confirming that Israel had focused 
on constructing plutonium-based nuclear weapons.98  Israel may have laboratory-scale enrichment 
facilities at its Dimona nuclear complex. A 1974 CIA memorandum referred to the “ambiguous nature of 
Israeli efforts in the field of uranium enrichment.”99 
5.1 INDIA 
India began a nuclear weapons program in the 1960s over security threats from China and Pakistan. 
India’s weapons program focused on plutonium production using heavy water “research reactors” at the 
Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Trombay, especially the Canadian-designed CIRUS reactor 
that began operation in 1960 (Fig. 34). Uranium enrichment has not played a large role in India’s civilian 
nuclear program, either, since most of its power reactors are also heavy water reactors that use natural 
uranium fuel. India began operating a 100-centrifuge test cascade at BARC in 1985, and constructed a 
small GCEP called the Rattehalli Rare Materials Plant near Mysore in the late 1980s (Fig. 35).100  This 
plant is reportedly intended to produce HEU (with 30–45% 235U) for a possible nuclear-powered 
submarine program.101  None of India’s enrichment facilities are subject to safeguards. 
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Fig. 34. Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India.  Source: Google Earth 
 
 
Fig. 35. Rattehalli Rare Materials Plant, India.  Source: Google Earth 
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5.2 PAKISTAN 
Pakistan began a nuclear weapons program in earnest in 1974 after India tested a nuclear device. While 
initially focusing on plutonium production through foreign-supplied reactors, the program shifted its 
attention to uranium enrichment after foreign suppliers pulled out and A.Q. Khan returned from the 
Netherlands in 1975. A.Q. Khan had worked for the Urenco subcontractor FDO (Fysisch Dynamisch 
Onderzoekslaboratorium) at Almelo102, and, when he came to Pakistan, he brought stolen centrifuge plans 
as well as contacts with centrifuge component suppliers, forming the basis of Pakistan’s uranium 
enrichment program as well as the “Khan network,” an international nuclear black market that supplied 
centrifuge technology to Libya, Iran, and DPRK. In Pakistan, Khan founded what became the Khan 
Research Laboratory (KRL) at Kahuta (Fig. 36), Pakistan’s primary enrichment facility, overseen by the 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). The capacity of the GCEP at KRL is not well known; 
estimates range from 5,000 SWU/year up to over 100,000 SWU/year,103 while the general consensus is 
that the capacity is somewhere in the range of 15,000–20,000 SWU/year. 
 
 
Fig. 36. Khan Research Laboratory, Kahuta, Pakistan.  Source: Google Earth 
 
There have been unconfirmed reports since the 1980s that Pakistan may be constructing another GCEP at 
Golra Sharif outside of Islamabad. A recent news report stated that the PAEC may build a large 
commercial enrichment plant as part of the planned Pakistan Nuclear Power Fuel Complex (PNPFC) in 
Kundian, near the Chashma power reactors.104,105  None of Pakistan’s enrichment facilities are currently 
subject to safeguards. However, the Kyodo report suggests that Pakistan would be willing to submit the 
new plant at Kundian to safeguards as part of a nuclear deal similar to the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal of 
2005. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Currently, the world enrichment capacity is approximately 53 million kg-separative work units (SWU) 
per year, with 22 million in gaseous diffusion and 31 million in gas centrifuge plants.  The capacity to 
produce another 23 million SWU/year is under construction or planned for the near future, almost entirely 
using gas centrifuge separation.  Most capacity is concentrated in Russia, the United States, and France, 
with the three Urenco countries, China and Japan rounding out the bulk of the capacity.  Most current and 
planned enrichment capacity is through gas centrifuge separation.  Laser isotope separation may become 
the technology of choice for new enrichment plants in the future, but current enrichment plants will 
probably continue operating as long as it is economical to do so. 
 
The idea has been discussed of limiting the spread of enrichment technology to current technology 
holders, designating a fixed group of enrichment “supplier” countries, in the same way that the list of 
official nuclear weapon states was established as those countries with nuclear weapons at the first signing 
of the NPT in 1968.  Plans for small enrichment programs by states such as Iran, Brazil, Argentina, South 
Africa, and Australia may be partially based on the desire to be considered among these “supplier” 
countries if such a distinction ever becomes official.  One possible alternative is the creation of 
international fuel centers, such as the proposed center at Angarsk in Russia, which would make 
enrichment services more widely available and assure nuclear fuel supplies for member states. 
 
The demand for new uranium enrichment 
capacity is expected to increase 
significantly over the next several decades 
(Fig. 37).  More fuel will be required for 
the nuclear reactors that are being planned 
and built, and the current supply of 
enrichment services will start to decrease 
as the older GDPs are shut down and 
alternative sources of fuel, such as 
through HEU blend-down, are depleted 
(the U.S.–Russian Megatons-to-
Megawatts program is expected to end in 
2013106).  As demand starts to exceed 
supply, the economics for investing in 
new enrichment plants will begin to look 
more attractive.  
    Source: Touch Briefings107 
 
The techniques and implementation of safeguards continue to evolve as the IAEA investigates new 
measures and incorporates new technologies.108  The IAEA has worked to expand the scope of its 
authority by implementing strengthened safeguards and encouraging states to adopt an Additional 
Protocol.109  Advanced safeguards technology such as more effective enrichment monitors, unattended 
monitoring, and uranium cylinder tracking can assist in better meeting the HSP goals of detecting 
diversion of declared material at declared facilities; additional measures such as environmental sampling 
and wide-area monitoring provide some capability to detect undeclared materials and facilities.110,111,112  
The IAEA will need to use an updated model approach along with advanced technology, an effort that 
began with the HSP in the early 1980s, to continue to efficiently and effectively apply safeguards as more 
uranium enrichment facilities come online in more countries.
Fig. 37. Projected world enrichment capacity and demand
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